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FAITH, HOPE, AND FAITHFULNESS 
Richard Creel 
James Muyskens argues that religious hope is by itself, without the support 
of evidence or faith, sufficient for an authentic religious life. I agree. He 
portrays religious faith as an epistemically secure attitude that is highly 
subject to exaggeration and delusion and that evokes a kind of relaxed con-
fidence which is incompatible with the inward intensity of a mature religious 
life. I disagree and argue that religious hope and religious faith are compat-
ible, religious faith can be epistemically astute, religious faith is an appro-
priate object of religious hope, and religious hope fortified by religious faith 
produces joyful hope. 
James Muyskens has done valuable, pioneering work on the concept of re-
ligious hope. I think his essay The Sufficiency of Hope should be required 
reading for every seminarian and every philosopher of religion. l I am less 
sanguine regarding what he says about religious faith. 2 He pits the life of 
religious hope and the life of religious faith against one another as though 
they are incompatible. He says that we must choose between "the vision of 
religious life as an uncertain venture requiring unrequited striving, courage, 
personal resolve against all odds," on the one hand, and, on the other hand, 
"the vision of cosmic security with its attendant sense of well-being, world 
order, tranquility." He depicts the former type of life as being based on hope 
and the latter on faith. He thinks the religious life based on faith is not 
epistemically respectable and that, therefore, we should choose a life of hope 
over a life of faith-though he adds that, "If the tranquility and cosmic 
security required [for a religious life based on faith] could be gained without 
conceptual cheating, without violating reasonable cognitive constraints, with-
out losing the passionate commitment of a genuinely religious life, without 
inconsistency, then, very probably, it ought to be preferred."3 
It seems to me that such emotional security can be enjoyed in this life 
within the bounds of reason-although, as Kant pointed out, in the mode of 
faith, not of certain knowledge. Yet faith need not be preferred to hope, as 
faith and hope are not mutually exclusive and can benefit one another-a 
possibility that Muyskens does not explore. Consider a person who enjoys 
both propositional religious faith and propositional religious hope and who 
is philosophically astute. She realizes that her confidence that that is true 
which she hopes is true is of the nature of faith, not of certain knowledge or 
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even of evidentially justified belief. She thinks that her religious convictions 
are profoundly insecure epistemically, and yet she is blessed with emotional 
assurance that what she hopes is true is true-even as most of us are blessed 
with confidence that we are what we seem and are not brains in a vat.4 Hence, 
a life of religious hope can be fortified by faith; we need not choose between 
them. 
Muyskens also makes a mistake, I think, about the biblical view of faith 
and hope. "In the biblical view," he writes, "faith is logically prior to hope" 
(136). In support ~f this claim he quotes Thomas Aquinas, who said, "It is 
thus apparent that faith comes before hope" (137).5 Muyskens made these 
statements by way of justifying his claim that the Bible has things backwards 
when it claims that faith precedes hope. Rather, he claims, hope precedes 
faith; not vice versa. Because of an ambiguity that Muyskens seems to miss, 
I think he is right in what he wants to affirm and wrong in what he wants to 
deny. 
Muyskens wants to affirm that hope is a sufficient foundation for a sincere 
and focused religious life; he insists that faith is not, as many think, a nec-
essary condition for the living of an authentic religious life. 6 I think Muyskens 
is profoundly correct that hope is a sufficient basis for a sincere religious life, 
but I think he is wrong that the biblical point of view places faith logically 
prior to hope-except in the following instance, which I shall explain in 
relation to his reference to Aquinas. 
Aquinas is not speaking of religious hope on its most general level when 
he says that faith is prior to hope; he is speaking of the hope of a-person-of-
faith for personal salvation. His point is that it is only after one has been 
given faith in the reality and goodness of God that one can begin to hope that 
the God in whom one now has faith will forgive one's sins and accept one 
into his kingdom. That seems correct. 
Along this same line St. Paul says in Romans 5:1-2: "Therefore, since we 
are justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ. 
Through him we have obtained access to this grace in which we stand, and 
we rejoice in our hope of sharing the glory of God." Clearly the hope of 
which St. Paul is speaking is the hope of people who have the gift of faith 
that in Christ God made it possible for them to be reconciled to him and to 
enter into glory with him and, who, on the basis of that faith, hope that they 
will enter into such glory.7 This relation between confidence and hope can be 
illustrated also from media stories about certain would-be refugees from East 
Germany in October, 1989. Having fled from East Germany to Hungary, they 
waited anxiously under guard in Hungary, not knowing whether they would 
be returned to East Germany or allowed to go legally to West Germany. 
Eventually they were assured that a train was coming to make it possible for 
some of them to travel legally to West Germany; however, they were told that 
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the train would not be able to take everyone. On the basis of their confidence 
that such a train was coming, they then began to hope as individuals that they 
would be among those who were taken. Clearly, it was only after they had 
confidence that a train was coming to take some of them to West Germany 
that they could begin to hope that they, as individuals, would be among those 
who were taken. However, if, without having any reason to expect a rescue 
train, one of those individuals had begun to hope that a rescue train would 
come, then in that case hope would have preceded confidence-just as hope 
can precede faith in the religious case. 
Faith can, then, precede and ground hope, and it is understood to do so in 
some biblical statements. But Muyskens is not correct in saying without 
qualification that, "In the biblical view, faith is logically prior to hope." The 
author of Hebrews 11: I, for example, is quite explicit that faith is the assur-
ance of things hoped for. 8 This entails that faith, at least sometimes, is logi-
cally subsequent to hope, not antecedent to it. That is, sometimes first we 
hope; then we receive emotional assurance that what we hope for is true. 
St. Peter provides another example of religious hope functioning inde-
pendently of faith when he bids Christians to "Always be prepared to make 
a defense to anyone who calls you to account for the hope that is in you" (I 
Peter 3: 15). It seems clear from context that St. Peter's immediate reference 
was to the hope of Christians that Jesus is the Christ, but there seems every 
reason to think that if he did not have logically deeper hopes in mind at the 
time, such as that Jesus was God incarnate or that there is a God, that he 
would have readily included those among the hopes for which Christians 
should be ready to account. Of course, for the Christian to account for her 
hope by an appeal to her faith would be to the non-believer, to whom one is 
supposed to be giving an account, no account at all, so surely that was not 
what St. Peter was asking Christians to do.9 That suggests that St. Peter 
recognized that Christian hope is not necessarily dependent on Christian faith 
and can be defended independently of an appeal to Christian faith-contrary 
to what Muyskens claims. 
Notice also how differently we proceed in defending what we hope is the 
case as distinguished from what we have faith is the case. We defend what 
we hope is the case by referring to what we judge to be its goodness. We 
hope it is true because we believe it would be good were it true. A defense 
of one's faith would proceed quite differently-if such a defense is intelligi-
ble. After all, faith that p is very like or identical to a basic belief that p, and 
what it means for a belief to be basic is that it is not held because of evidential 
considerations; consequently, it would be misleading at best and incoherent 
at worst to try to give an evidential defense of it. 
Finally, consider the response of the apostles on the road to Emmaus when 
they encountered the risen Christ without recognizing him. Jesus asked them, 
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"What is this conversation which you are holding with each other as you 
walk?" They told Jesus, whom they still did not recognize, that they were 
talking of Jesus of Nazareth, "who was a prophet mighty in deed and word 
before God and all the people," but who had been condemned and crucified 
by the authorities. The apostles added: "we had hoped that he was the one to 
redeem Israel" (Luke 24: 13-21). Notice, the apostles did not say, "We had 
faith that he was the one to redeem Israel;" they said they had hoped that he 
was the redeemer of Israel-though it is possible, of course, that they also 
had faith, along with their hope, that Jesus was the Christ. Again, it seems, 
we have a biblical episode which shows that Muyskens is wrong in claiming 
that, "In the biblical view, faith is logically prior to hope." 
There is not, however, an absolute priority of hope over faith. In the life 
of an individual, either might come first, or they might occur simultaneously. 
As an example of faith preceding hope, consider that a person might grow 
up confident that there is a God but then come to realize that her confidence 
is of the nature of faith rather than of certain knowledge or justified belief. 
Because of that realization, she might subsequently begin to hope that her 
faith is veridical. (It would, of course, also be possible for such a person to 
be indifferent to the content of her faith or to hope that it is false-depending 
on whether she is pleased, displeased, or indifferent about that which she has 
faith is the case.) 
A.lternatively, especially in our era of indifference and hostility toward 
religion, a person might grow up without faith that there is a God and might 
even believe that evidence favors the non-existence of God yet begin to hope 
that the evidence is significantly incomplete or has been misunderstood and 
that there is a God; this same person might later acquire faith that there is a 
God even though she continues to think that the evidence with which she is 
familiar favors the non-existence of God. 
I think, then, that Muyskens is right and wrong when he says that "a life 
of faith would not be possible if we were certain that God does not exist or 
if we believed that He does not. Such belief is incompatible with faith" (48). 
If by "a life of faith" Muyskens means, as I think he does, "a life of faithful-
ness to God," i.e., a life of endeavor to do the will of God and to be in a right 
relationship with God, then he is correct that we could not live a life of 
faithfulness directed to God as our intentional object if we were certain that 
God does not exist. We cannot coherently endeavor to achieve and maintain 
a right relationship with someone whom we are certain does not exist.!O 
However, Muyskens is incorrect to add that we could not lead such a life if 
we merely believed that God does not exist (as distinguished from thinking 
that we know for certain that God does not exist).!! If the evidence against 
the existence of God of which one is aware is not thought to be conclusive, 
that leaves one free to have faith and/or hope that God exists, and to endeavor 
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to live, on the basis of that faith and/or hope, as though God exists, in the 
faith and/or hope that the reasons for thinking that he does not exist are 
misleading. 
Consider a parallel. Coretta King, the gifted wife of the late Martin Luther 
King, Jr., has since his death been devoted to the work for which he is widely 
revered. What if Rev. King had been kidnapped rather than assassinated, and 
what if subsequent evidence had indicated by all reasonable standards that 
he had almost certainly been killed by his kidnappers. His wife, Coretta, could 
believe, i.e., be convinced on the basis of evidence, that he was dead, yet in 
hope that he was not, she could live a life of faithfulness to him, i.e., she 
could endeavor to live her life such that were he in fact alive and returned 
to her, he would see that she had been profoundly faithful to him and to his 
dream of a better world. 
When the principle involved in the preceding example is applied to theism, 
it generates Kierkegaard's point that our most fundamental task as humans 
is to live our lives so that if what we hope to be true is true, we will have 
lived our lives appropriately-e.g., so that if we hope that there is a God and 
that Jesus was God incarnate, that God/Jesus will look approvingly on how 
we have endeavored to live our lives. Clearly, Kierkegaard would not have 
agreed that he believed, i.e., had evidentially based confidence, that God 
exists, yet he endeavored to live a religiously faithful life. Indeed, he is often 
referred to as a paradigm of the religiously faithful person. In brief, someone 
who hopes against hope that there is a God, i.e., who hopes against a negative 
but not probative balance of evidence that there is a God, can also live a life 
devoted to God-or at least meant to be devoted to God-and what else can 
we do in this life in which we do not know for certain that God exists except 
endeavor to live our lives in ways that we think and hope will be approved 
by God if he does exist? 
My point that a life devoted to God is a life that is meant to be devoted to 
God but might not be, calls for distinctions between faith-that, faith-in, and 
faithfulness. Faith-that and faith-in are relational concepts. In "faith that" the 
relata are the one who has faith, the proposition that is the object of one's 
faith, and the property of truth, which one is non-evidentially confident the 
proposition has. Whether one actually has faith that God exists is conceptu-
ally unaffected by whether God exists. 
"Faith in" is not conceptually independent of existence. The relata of "faith 
in" are the one who has faith, the person or thing in which one has faith, and 
some property that the one who has faith is non-evidentially confident is 
possessed by that person or thing. One can have faith that something exists, 
but one has faith in only something that one thinks does exist. It would be 
odd to say, "I have faith in the existence of God." Rather, we have faith that 
God exists, and we have faith in the goodness or power of God. 
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One can have faith that something exists which does not exist, but one can 
have faith in only something that does exist-though one can think one has 
faith in something that, unbeknownst to one, does not in fact exist. If I said, 
"I have faith in Boris Yeltsin's ability to save Russia and its neighbors from 
starvation and anarchy this winter," and you convinced me by an authoritative 
document that he had died, it would be a conceptual confusion for me to say, 
"Well, I still have faith In him." Rather, I should say, "Well, I would have 
faith in him if he were still alive." This shows that it is possible to have the 
intention of having faith in someone even when it is not possible to actually 
have faith in him because he no longer exists (or never did exist-as with 
the Easter Bunny and the Tooth Fairy). This means, of course, that if there 
is no God, then no one has ever had faith in God, though many people have 
thought they did and many think they do. 
Now let's look at faith-in and faithfulness. Faith-in is a disposition concept; 
faithfulness is an action concept. Faith-in need not have expressed itself in 
action; faithfulness seems to require that one have intentionally acted on a 
commitment and be resolved to continue acting on that commitment. Typi-
cally, faithfulness to God consists of honoring the name of God and consci-
entiously seeking to do the will of God. For a person of positive faith, it 
consists of acting on the content of her faith. But, of course, a person who is 
not a theist out of faith but is a theist out of mere hope or only on the basis 
of evidence can be faithful in the sense of conscientiously endeavoring to do 
what she thinks God wills or would will that she do. If there is not a God, 
then, of course, no one is living a life faithful to God or devoted to God or 
based on faith in God. If God does not exist, then I cannot be faithful to 
God-though in my ignorance of his non-existence I can mean to be faithful 
to God, and even think that I am. 
If One Has Hope, Then Why Want Faith? 
One can, then, hope to be saved by God even if one does not believe or have 
faith that there is a God. One can hope both that there is a God and that God 
will save one from sin and death, and one can endeavor to live in the light 
of that hope-"without violating reasonable cogniti ve constraints." But if that 
is the case, and if hope is a sufficient foundation for the living of a religious 
life, then is religious faith otiose for one who has religious hope? Thomas 
Merton thought not. Merton, who after years of struggle with religious doubts 
became a Trappist monk, reports in The Seven Storey Mountain that while he 
was still waxing hot and cold toward religion he attended a worship service. 
During the service, he says, "when it came time to say the Apostle's Creed, 
I stood up and said it, with the rest [of the congregation], hoping within 
myself that God would give me the grace someday to really believe it."12 
Clearly, Merton was hoping for faith that the Apostle's Creed is true. But if 
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one hopes that the Apostle's Creed, or some other set of religious proposi-
tions, is true, and if one endeavors to live in the light of that hope, and if, as 
Muyskens argues and I agree, a religious life can be lived on the basis of 
such hope, i.e., if one can be religiously faithful on the basis of hope alone, 
then why be concerned, as Merton was, to also have faith-especially if, as 
Muyskens warns, faith is neither knowledge nor evidentially justified belief 
but is easily confused with both and is highly subject to exaggeration and 
delusion? 
The answer, I think, is that the state of mere hope, even though its object 
is religious, can feel cold, empty, and desperate. It seems obvious that it 
would be better to feel warm, full, and confident. Therefore it seems virtually 
impossible to be indifferent to those negative emotions, and it seems natural 
to want to feel otherwise. Indeed, it seems reasonable to think that religious 
hope itself would lead us to desire religious faith-as I think it did in Merton's 
case-though, of course, it should lead us to desire religious faith that is not 
exaggerated or deluded. 
The preceding sentiments seem contained in part in a popular hymn by 
Hugh T. Kerr, "God of Our Life, Through All the Circling Years." Kerr writes: 
"Lead us by faith to hope's true promised land; Be thou our guide. With thee 
to bless, the darkness shines as light, And faith's fair vision changes into 
sight."13 This hymn is a prayer for faith that what one hopes for is true. Hope 
is in part a vision, e.g., of the promised land and how to get there; faith is 
confidence that that vision is truthful.I 4 When we are travelling dangerous, 
unfamiliar territory, the journey is less traumatic and more gratifying if we 
are confident of our map. Faith is, or at least can be, confidence in what is 
mapped out by hope-and the map of hope may, of course, be provided by 
divine revelation, rather than human speculation. 
There is a saying that "It is better to journey in hope than to arri ve." That 
is true if every destination will disappoint us. In such a case there might be 
wisdom in pausing to rest or smell the flowers, but not in stopping. However, 
if there is a God, then there is a destination that will not disappoint us-a 
destination at which it would be better to arrive than merely to anticipate 
hopefully or pass through quickly. It might be described as personal knowl-
edge of God, or, in Thomistic terms, "the vision of God." Positive religious 
faith involves confident enjoyment of-not merely awareness of the possi-
bility of, but confident enjoyment of-that destination by description, even 
if not yet by acquaintance. 15 
Hope, by contrast, has the texture of imagination, not perception. As a 
consequence it cannot give the same richness to religious life as can faith 
(and, of course, mere propositional faith cannot give the same richness of 
texture to religious life as can religious experience).16 Consider, for example, 
the difference between the feeling of anguished hope that a startling letter is 
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from one's long lost, beloved sibling, long thought to be dead, but indicated 
by the letter to be alive, and the feeling of faith that the letter is authentic-
faith which realizes intellectually that it might be mistaken but which is 
nonetheless suffused with conviction that the letter is authentic. 17 Surely such 
propositional faith is a happier state of mind than is the state of mere hope, 
and, if its propositional content is true, it is to be preferred to mere hope that 
the same content is true. Hope is grape juice; faith is wine. 
It seems true also that at least sometimes in difficult situations faith gives 
us the composure to think more clearly and the strength of will to persevere 
longer and more vigorously than we could without it. Also, faith gives us 
poise and is, therefore, more effective than mere hope at keeping fear and 
desperation from miscuing or paralyzing action. Faith instills confidence, 
peace, strength, fortitude; it fortifies hope and enables action. The desirability 
of such things makes the desirability of faith seem obvious when it is com-
bined with epistemic openness and honesty, as I believe it can be. IS 
Does Faith Detract From Religious Intensity? 
Muyskens thinks that these benefits of religious faith generate a relaxed 
confidence which is not compatible with the intensity of inwardness that 
characterizes a mature religious life, so he prefers religion based on hope to 
religion based on faith (137). Because of my understanding of faith, I think 
his dichotomy is unnecessary and unfortunate. Anguished hope that the Gos-
pel be true, hope that is anguished because so much seems to be shouting 
that the Gospel is false, is certainly a form of religious intensity which 
indicates that the hoper loves God and is not merely going along with what 
a flow of evidence seems to indicate (as an evidentialist theist might do). 
However, joyful faith that the Gospel is true is a clear indication of love of 
God because it implies that if one were to lose one's faith, one would be 
distraught and would hope desperately that the content of one's former faith 
is true even though one no longer enjoys subjective assurance of its truth. 
Further, religion based on faith is not religion on the cheap, as Muyskens 
suggests it is. There are equal demands on the person of faith and the person 
of hope for faithfulness, i.e., for loyalty to the object of one's religious 
commitment. Further, hope and faith can be thought to be in the same boat 
evidentially, i.e., are equally precarious epistemically. 
Regarding epistemic insecurity, Muyskens, taking his cue from 
Kierkegaard, emphasizes the objective uncertainty of the Gospel and adds 
that religious hope recognizes this objective uncertainty and so is motivated 
to commitment by love of the object of hope, not by mere confidence that it 
exists. I want to point out that faith, too, is characterized by objective uncer-
tainty. Faith is subjective confidence that is not grounded evidentially. 
To be sure, faith can be accompanied by evidence in its support, but it need 
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not be. When it is not, then it is no more epistemically secure than is hope. 19 
The philosophically sensitive person whose religious hope becomes buoyed 
by faith realizes that she is still suspended over 70,000 fathoms of water, 
epistemically speaking; her deep confidence that she will survive this situ-
ation does nothing to remove her awareness of the objective uncertainties and 
dangers of the situation. Nor does faith necessarily keep her from being 
battered by waves of negative evidence-but it does keep her from fearing 
that she will drown in them. 
Faith, then, makes the emotional life of the believer more positive, more 
bearable. It is easier to keep struggling against the waves when one is con-
fident that help is coming. Faith is the salt, the life-jacket, the buoyancy in 
the 70,000 leagues of water over which the person of faith is suspended, and 
she is deeply grateful for that buoyancy (and all the more grateful if earlier 
she had to struggle, perhaps for decades, in non-buoyant waters or with no 
life-jacket), but at every moment she realizes the possible precariousness of 
her situation-the water may suddenly lose its buoyancy, or the life-jacket 
may tear off, or a shark may come along and snap off her legs. 
Hence, faith does not entail naive confidence. The faith which happens to 
one, which seems to come as a gift, is not necessarily deluded faith; it does 
not necessarily mistake itself for certain knowledge or evidentially justified 
belief. Indeed, in philosophically astute theistic faith resides one of those 
exhilarating paradoxes in which Kierkegaard revelled, for in such faith there 
is profound subjective confidence that God is real and good and wise and 
powerful, while at the same time there is, or at least can be, a clear sense that 
there is enormous objective evidence that reality is indifferent at best and 
hostile at worst to human well-being. Hence, astute faith does nothing to take 
the edge off the objective uncertainty of its metaphysical content. 20 Unfortu-
nately, some people do not have such an epistemically discriminating under-
standing of faith, so they mislead others into thinking that faith is dogmatic 
or confused; yet other people, subconsciously disturbed by the objective 
uncertainty of their faith, shield themselves from awareness of that uncer-
tainty by papering over it with a bogus seal of evidential approvaJ.21 
Muyskens concedes toward the end of Sufficiency that one who subscribes 
to his theology of hope rather than to a theology of faith can live a life of 
religious hope and faithfulness, but not of "joyous expectation" (139). After 
all, theistic hope differs from theistic faith by wanting but not expecting what 
faith expects. However, I think Muyskens is selling short what a theology of 
hope can encompass. To be sure, a theology of hope cannot bestow faith upon 
anyone-but neither can a theology of faith; faith is a gift of grace, not of 
theology.22 But a theology of hope can encompass the possibility, legitimacy, 
and desirableness of faith among the many things included in the scope of 
Christian hope. When religious hope is suffused with religious faith, the result 
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is joyful hope-which is more than the mere-hope that Muyskens seems to 
think is all that a theology of hope can accommodate. Moreover, such faith-
filled hope would generate joyful expectation, e.g., of the coming of the 
Kingdom for which one hopes. The joy of such an expectation would arise 
from faith rather than evidence-though I do not mean to exclude the possi-
bility that the same joyful expectation might arise from an examination of 
evidence and therefore be enjoyed in the mode of belief rather than faith. 
Religious hope can, then, be fortified by faith. When it is, one's mere hope 
becomes joyful hope, enabling one to bob about optimistically over 70,000 
leagues of stormy water while well aware at each moment that one's sense 
of indestructibility could be shattered in the next moment. That is the miracle 
wrought by the gift of religious faith, of unsinkable confidence that there is 
a God who is infinitely wise, good, and powerful. It is this kind of confidence 
that St. Paul captured so powerfully when he wrote to Christians being per-
secuted in Rome: "I am sure that neither death, nor life ... nor anything else 
in all creation, will be able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus 
our Lord" (Romans 8:38-39). Faith, then, enables its recipient to be emotion-
ally confident while remaining intellectually honest in epistemically difficult 
circumstances. 23 Joyful hope, i.e., hope suffused by positive faith, is perhaps 
the most that we can reasonably hope for in this life in which, as St. Paul 
pointed out, we are destined to see things-but through a glass darkly. For-
tunately such joyful hope seems in all ways adequate for the proper appre-
ciation and living of this life. 
The upshot of the preceding reflections is that Muyskens' theology of hope 
is not adequate to the New Testament, for one of the primary aims of the New 
Testament, in addition to providing what Muyskens describes as "a sense of 
the direction of life, of its meaning and purpose," is to show that a sense of 
"cosmic security and acceptance" is possible in this life-but through faith, 
not evidence, and as a gift, not an achievement. Hence, one who adopts a 
theology of hope need not forego "a sense of cosmic security and the certainty 
of orthodox Christian claims" (144). To be sure, an adequate theology may 
take away these things insofar as they are in the mode of certain knowledge 
or evidential belief, but God can give them back in the mode of faith. When 
God does, the astute person of faith is no more subject to smugness or 
presumption than is the mere hoper, and both types of person have an equal 
obligation upon them to lead a life of faithfulness in a world of uncertainties, 
dangers, threats, and temptations. 
In closing I note that Thomas Aquinas pointed out that Christian hope is 
the golden mean between salvific despair and salvific presumption. Christian 
faith, I suggest, is the golden mean between epistemic despair and epistemic 
presumption. Faith-filled Christians should through reason be as confident 
that they should not be apodictic as to the truth of what they see through the 
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dark glass of faith as they are confident through faith that they see something 
wonderful. In hope that what they seem to see is what they see, faith-filled 
Christians should cherish their faith, find joy in it, and live according to it. 24 
Ithaca College 
NOTES 
1. James L.. Muyskens, The Sufficiency of Hope: The Conceptual Foundations of 
Religion (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979). The page numbers for quotations 
from Sufficiency will be placed in parentheses in the text. 
2. Similarly, I am sympathetic to much of what Louis Pojman has said about religious 
hope, but I disagree even more strongly with what he says about religious faith than with 
what Muyskens says. Muyskens has a firm distinction between faith and hope, whereas 
Pojman identil1es them with one another. His stated objective in "Faith Without Belief?" 
is to "develop a concept of faith as hope," rather than as propositional belief. The problem 
with this is that there is as profound a difference between religious hope and religious 
faith as there is between religious belief and religious hope (and between religious belief 
and religious faith). Hence, whereas Pojman's article advances our understanding of 
religious hope, it interferes with our understanding of religious faith and our sense of the 
distinctions between noetic, volitional, and emotive states, e.g., belief, actional faith 
(fidelity), and passional faith (non-evidential confidence), respectively. (In an unpublished 
paper, "The Gift of Faith," I discuss the fact that sometimes "faith" is used to refer to a 
passion and sometimes to an action.) 
Failure to see the distinction between faith (which is non-evidentially based) and belief 
(which is evidentially based) led Pojman to think that Blaise Pascal was recommending 
something epistemically degenerate when he recommended to would-be 'believers' that 
performing the external rituals of religion, such as going to Mass, kneeling, using holy 
water, etc., could occasion the acquisition of faith. Pascal's Pensees show that he was 
familiar with the distinction between faith as a passion, i.e., as something that happens to 
one, and evidential belief (he was the founder of modern probability theory), and between 
epistemically deluded faith and epistemically astute faith. It seems clear that he was urging 
religious practice as a means to receipt of the latter, i.e., astute faith, and not as a way for 
us, as Pojman puts it, "to get [ourselves] to believe what [we] don't believe by an impartial 
look at the evidence" (172). See Pojman's "Faith Without Belief?" in Faith and Philosophy 
(3/2), April' 86, 157-176. 
3. Sufficiency, 113. This depiction of the life of faith and the life of hope as being 
mutually exclusive permeates 134-44 also. 
4. In "The Virtue of Faith," Faith and Philosophy, 1/1 (Jan. '84),3-15, Robert Adams 
conceptualizes faith along lines similar to my own. He writes: "The certitude of faith has 
much more to do with confidence, or freedom from fear, which is partly an emotional 
state, than it has to do with judgments of certainty or great probability in any evidential 
sense" (10). Yet there is also a deep difference. My focus is on faith as emotional 
confidence in the truth of a proposition. Adams' focus is on faith as emotional trust which 
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issues in appropriate, fearless actions. He does a disturbingly good job of showing how 
weakness of faith can be an expression of sinfulness. However, I think that the fear that 
sometimes causes us to flinch in the face of religious hardships is not always sinful and 
is not entirely escapable because no matter how deep our faith in the goodness, wisdom, 
and power of God, those of us who do not know for certain that God exists know that 
God may not exist and that, therefore, our religious actions may be frustrated or punished 
not because God is not good or trustworthy but because he does not exist. 
5. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theoiogiae, 2a2ae.17, 7. 
6. Note that Muyskens' claim is that hope is a sufficient foundation for an authentic 
religious life. He is not saying that hope is a sufficient condition of an authentic religious 
life. For a religious life which is based on hope to be complete, it must combine hope with 
faithfulness, i.e., with disciplined devotion to the one whom or that which one hopes exists, 
e.g., Christ or Brahman. 
7. John Paul Heil takes Aquinas' position because he finds it also to be St. Paul's 
position. See his Romans-Paul s Letter of Hope (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1987). 
There he says the following about the dynamic relations of faith and hope. "The first 
element [in the dynamics of biblical hope] is 'what God has promised and/or already 
accomplished on our behalf.' This element might be termed the objective basis or foun-
dation from God for hope. It provides the possibility to hope for God's future salvific 
activity. This element thus serves as the basis or 'promise' for God's future salvific activity 
or its completion in the future. The second element is 'faith.' The element of faith, then, 
might be termed the subjective basis or presupposition of hope. And so hope can be 
considered a consequence of faith" (6). 
It is then, according to Heil, faith in what God has accomplished in Christ that makes 
it possible for one to hope that one will be a personal beneficiary of that divine accom-
plishment. I appreciate Heil's point but think it is too strong. Someone who encounters 
the Gospel and does not have faith that it is true, and therefore cannot hope for salvation 
on the basis of faith, can, nonetheless, hope that the Gospel is true and that, if it is true, 
she will be saved by Christ. 
8. This, of course, does not exclude the possibility that a gift of faith can bring its own 
propositional content and not merely be an affirmation of something that one hoped for 
prior to faith. 
9. In "Agatheism," Faith and Philosophy, 1011 (Jan. '93),33-48, I argue that a justification 
of religious hope must proceed in terms of axiological, not evidential, considerations. 
10. The distinction between faithfulness, on the one hand, and faith and hope, on the 
other hand, is very important. Merely to hope that God exists is, obviously, not to live a 
life of faithfulness; but neither is it the case that merely to have faith that God exists is to 
live a life of faithfulness. Faithfulness is a species of action; hope and faith are species of 
passion, the former of desire and the latter of conviction (or of 'belief' -used in its generic, 
non-modal sense of thinking that something is the case, but without regard to whether what 
one holds to be the case is held on a non-evidential basis or on an evidential basis). 
II. In Sufficiency Muyskens notes that in addition to people using "believe" to refer to 
propositions about which they are certain, "There is a use of 'believe' in which it is used 
as a retreat from certainty: 'Well, I'm not certain that p, but I do believe that p. I should 
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be surprised if not-p'; or, 'I guess that 1 don't know that p but 1 believe that p'" (152). 
Given Muyskens' clear grasp of this distinction between knowing and believing, it seems 
clear that in his statement, "a life of faith would not be possible if we were certain that 
God does not exist or if we believed that He does not," he is not simply repeating himself 
in those two hypothetical clauses. Rather, he is saying both that a life of faith would not 
be possible if we were certain that God does not exist and that a life of faith would not 
be possible if we were not certain that God did not exist but believed that he did not. My 
contention is that he is right that the first antecedent excludes the possibility of a life of 
faith, but he is wrong to say that the second antecedent is incompatible with a life of faith. 
One might believe that God does not exist yet have faith that God does. 
12. Thomas Merton, The Seven Storey Mountain (NY: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 
1948, 1976), p. 176. 
13. Pilgrim Hymnal (The Pilgrim Press, 1958). 
14. One's vision of God's kingdom can be nested in faith without hope, or in hope 
without faith, or in both hope and faith. The role of vision in religious hope is articulated 
nicely by Stewart Sutherland in his article "Hope" in The Philosophy in Christianity, ed. 
Godfrey Vesey (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 193-206. Sutherland portrays relig-
ious hope as "a moral vision of what might be" (200). Such hope, he adds, "is a basis for 
the critical evaluation of our world, rather than a flight from it" (201). 
15. The relation between faith and religious experience is complex and subtle. One can 
have a purely propositional faith that there is a supremely perfect being, i.e., one can have 
a non-evidential conviction of the existence of God which is not grounded in a mystical 
or religious experience-just as one could have faith that there is life on other planets 
without feeling that one has had an experience of the presence of or communication from 
an extraterrestrial being. A conviction that God exists which is grounded in a religious 
experience is of the nature of faith, 1 think, if the individual's conviction is not generated 
by an evidential relation to that experience, i.e., if the experience just seems to be an 
experience of a supremely perfect being, so it is not the case that the person has the 
experience and then, as a result of reflection on it, concludes that a supremely perfect 
being exists. The person's faith is that the experience is veridical. 
Propositional faith can, then, (1) be subsequent to a religious experience (in which case 
faith succeeds the religious experience and may even be caused by it but is not evidentially 
grounded on it)., or it can (2) be grounded in a religious experience (in which case faith 
and religious experience arise together and support one another but are not evidentially 
related), or faith can (3) give rise to religious experience-or, perhaps better, to experi-
encing religiously (in which case religious faith causes one to see and feel oneself, others, 
history and/or the universe in a new and spiritual way). 
The posture of faith in God typically consists of trust in the goodness, wisdom, and 
power of a God whom one thinks exists. Hence, faith in God is a richer phenomenon than 
is mere faith that God exists. As we saw earlier, we must not confuse mere propositional 
faith that there is a God with a feeling of the presence and grace of God-which is a matter 
of experiencing., or at least seeming to experience, the presence and grace of an actual 
person. Obviously, such experience is more to be desired than mere propositional faith 
that God exists. Faith grounded in religious experience is faith that what one seems to be 
experiencing is what one is experiencing. 
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16. Alan Wood has said in criticism of Muyskens' position regarding the sufficiency of 
religious hope that religious hope is "a drastic watering down of what 'faith' has tradi-
tionally meant" and is "a very pale thing compared with what religious people have meant 
by faith." I do not think that Wood has appreciated the rich and profound possibilities of 
religious hope, but I agree with the thrust of his statements insofar as their intent is to 
disagree with Muyskens' suggestion that religious hope is a satisfactory substitute for 
religious faith. I thank Prof. Wood for personal correspondence on these points and for 
permission to quote him. 
17. Perhaps in this life the analogue to veridical religious experience, in contrast to 
purely propositional religious faith, would be actually seeing one's beloved sibling briefly 
in a way that leaves no doubt in one's mind that it was one's sibling but in such a way 
that one realizes intellectually that one could have been mistaken due to poor lighting, 
slight differences in physical features, and such brief exposure. 
18. Hope is human; faith is divine. Faith in Christ is a divine gift. Faithfulness to Christ 
is a human activity. Such faithfulness is the appropriate response to the gift of faith-
though even then we need the additional gift of divine grace to help us in our efforts to 
live faithfully: I develop these points more fully in an unpublished paper, "The Gift of 
Faith." 
19. I think with regard to metaphysical propositions, such as "God exists," it would be 
viciously circular to argue that faith that p is evidence that p. 
20. Muyskens does an excellent job of distinguishing religious hope from evidential 
optimism, but he does not seem to see that whereas positive religious faith is a species of 
optimism, it is not a species of evidential optimism, and therefore it does not (or at least 
should not) share the intellectual confidence of evidential optimism. On hope and opti-
mism, see Sufficiency, 27-35. 
21. However, just as hope can be accompanied by faith, perhaps faith can be accompa-
nied by belief, i.e., by a good evidential case for its contents. I do not mean to rule out 
this possibility. My concern is that we should not allow the concepts of faith and belief 
to be muddled together. Nor should we allow anyone to think that the dignity of faith 
resides in evidential support or to mistake the confidence of faith for the confidence of 
belief. If we want the confidence of belief regarding religious propositions, we must ante 
up what we take to be sufficient evidence, as have, for example, Richard Swinburne in 
The Existence of God (NY: Oxford University Press, 1979) and the nine contributors, 
mostly natural scientists, to Evidence for Faith, ed. John Warwick Montgomery (Dallas: 
Probe Books, 1991). 
22. The concept of faith as a gift from God seems clearly contained in the Bible, and 
especially in the New Testament. See, e.g., Acts 15:9, Acts 18:27, Rom. 12:3, I Cor. 12:9, 
Gal. 5:22 (preferably the Greek), Eph. 2:8, and Hebrews 11: 1. Also, in the Oxford 
Annotated Bible, RSV (NY: Oxford University Press, 1962), the gloss on John 6:64-65 
says, "These truths can be discerned only by faith, which is God's gift, not man's 
achievement (Eph. 2:8)." The very next gloss, on verses 66-71, presumes the idea of faith 
as a gift to which we are called to respond. The commentator says, "To receive God's gift 
of faith is to know God in Christ; to refuse it is to become an ally of the devil." The idea 
is right, but the wording seems misleading. A libertarian theist should say that whether 
we receive the gift of faith is up to God, not us, but whether we accept the gift of faith or 
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refuse it, whether we cherish it or ignore it, is up to us. To cherish it and act upon it is not 
merely to have faith; it is to be faithful. 
For an intriguingly relevant statement in the Old Testament, see Isaiah 32: 17. There 
Isaiah tells the Israelites that after a bleak era, the Spirit will be poured over them from 
on high, bringing about righteousness, one result of which will be "quietness and confi-
dence for ever" (New English Bible). 
23. Such faith may be purely propositional, but it need not be. Propositional faith that 
one is loved by God might be caused by or grounded in an experience of the presence and 
love of God, but it need not be. When it is not, presumably even purely propositional faith 
that one is forgiven and loved by God would cause feelings of peace or joy. Still, the peace 
and joy caused by a purely propositional conviction that one is loved by God should not 
be confused with an experience of God's love being, as St. Paul put it, "poured into our 
hearts through the Holy Spirit." In light of this point, I modify an earlier point as follows: 
hope is water; faith is grape juice; religious experience is wine. 
24. Because what Christians see through faith seems to them to be good news for 
everyone, they share its substance with non-Christians, encourage them to evaluate it, and, 
if they agree to its goodness, invite them to join in Christian hope and pray for faith of 
their own; i.e., they invite them to pray for personal faith in the corporate faith of the 
Church-and they join them in that prayer. ' 
